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PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE: A SURVEY OF THE ISSUES
SURROUNDING LEGALIZATION
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 26, 1997, the United States Supreme Court decided that an
individual has no constitutionally protected right to request the assistance
of a physician in ending his or her life.' However, the decision left the
door open for the states to make individual determinations as to whether
physician-assisted suicide should be legal. 2 "Physician-assisted suicide
occurs when a physician facilitates a patient's death by providing the
necessary means and/or information to enable the patient to perform the
life-ending act." 3 The notion of physician-assisted suicide is ripe for
public debate. Although it is now considered morally and legally permis-
sible to withdraw and withhold care for the competent terminally ill,4
many believe that the leap from withdrawing care to physician-assisted
suicide is untenable 5 since it essentially means that a physician is
purposely taking a life.
By examining the issue of physician-assisted suicide from the indi-
vidual perspective of the patient as well as the collective perspective of
society, this Note will identify the controversy surrounding physician-
assisted suicide, explore its origins, and discuss how a resolution might
be achieved. Section II of this Note will discuss the changes which have
caused society to consider accepting the idea of physician-assisted
suicide. Section III will explain the end-of-life choices that have already
gained acceptance and how they differ from physician-assisted suicide.
Section IV will discuss the recent Supreme Court decisions denying a
constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide. Section V will explore
how the states are currently handling end-of-life decisions and examine
a model for the legalization of physician-assisted suicide.
1. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2275 (1997); Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293,
2302 (1997).
2. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2275. "Throughout the Nation, Americans are engaged in an earnest
and profound debate about the morality, legality, and practicality of physician-assisted suicide. Our
holding permits this debate to continue, as it should in a democratic society." Id.
3. CODE OF MEDICAL ETHics 56 (AMA, 1996-97 ed.). For example, the physician provides
sleeping pills and information about the lethal dose, while aware that the patient may commit suicide.
Id.
4. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (inferring that a
person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment).
5. David J. Doukas et al., Attitudes and Behaviors on Physician-Assisted Death: A Study of
Michigan Oncologists, 13 J. OF CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 1055 (1995).
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II. EMERGENCE OF THE ISSUE
Suicide has always been an issue society has confronted, as
evidenced by its treatment in literature, 6 in common law, 7 and even in the
Hippocratic Oath. 8 Historically, America has opposed suicide and at one
time even imposed a criminal forfeiture sanction which stripped real and
personal property from the person attempting suicide if he was not suc-
cessful, or from his heirs if he was successful. 9 Eventually such laws
were repealed, not because of a general acceptance of suicide by society,
but rather due to a recognition of the ineffectiveness of the sanction.10
Given the historically negative treatment of suicide, one must ask
why physician-assisted suicide is on the tip of our tongues today. In
other words, what changes have occurred to force society to consider
accepting the concept of suicide merely because it is carried out with the
aid of a physician. The following subsections discuss four factors which
suggest that the answer is tied to advances in medical technology and
6. See, e.g., Thomas J. Marzen et al., Suicide: A Constitutional Right?, 24 DUQ. L. REV. 1, 17-56
(1985) (tracing attitudes towards suicide through history). In the Old Testament, Saul died by falling
on his sword when he lost all hope. Id. at 18 (citing 1 Samuel 31:4). In 1621, clergyman Richard
Burton published a book entitled The Anatomy of Melancholy which explored the causes and symptoms
of depression and questioned the traditional notion that one who committed suicide would be damned.
Id. at 31 (citing N. Farberow, Cultural History of Suicide, in S uCIDE IN DIFFERENT CULTURES 1, 3-4 (N.
Farberow ed. 1975)). In the 1800s, philosopher David Hume commented on suicide stating that the
commission of suicide was a disturbance to the laws of nature. Id. at 34-35 (citing DAVID HUME, On
Suicide, in THE PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS 566 (1826)). And in the 1900s, Thomas Jefferson commented
on laws requiring forfeiture of property as punishment for suicide. Id. at 44-45 (citing 2 THOMAs
JEFFERSON, THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 496 (J.P. Boyd ed. 1952)).
7. For over 700 years, Anglo-American common law has punished or otherwise disapproved of
suicide. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2263. The American colonies followed English common law in
referring to suicide as "self-murder". Id. at 2264. Individuals who committed the crime of
self-murder, or their surviving heirs were subject to a criminal forfeiture sanction. Id. English
common law required that the movable goods of a person who committed suicide be confiscated by
the Crown rather than going to the family of the deceased. Id. at 2263. This approach was adopted by
the legislators of the Providence Plantations, later to become Rhode Island, which required forfeiture
of goods and chattels, but left the actor's debts and lands to the actor's heirs. Id. at 2264. Colonial
Virginia required a dishonorable burial of the actor and forfeiture of the entire estate to the crown.
Id.
8. "1 will neither give a deadly drug to anybody if asked for it, nor will I make a suggestion to this
effect." LUDWIG EDELSTEIN, THE HIpPocRATIc OATH: TEXT, TRANSLATION AND INTERPRETATION 3
(1943). All modem interpretations of the Hippocratic Oath assume that this clause of the Oath means
that a physician is charged not to assist a patient in suicide. Id. at 7. In ancient times, the taking of
poison was the most usual means of committing suicide, and such suicide was often the response when
the sick felt their pains had become intolerable and no help could be expected. Id. at 8-9. The patient
naturally turned to his physician who was in possession of deadly drugs and knew those which brought
about an easy and painless death. Id. at 9. The direction not to supply a deadly drug was therefore an
attempt to guide the physician in terms of how he should respond to such requests, in an age when
voluntary death was an everyday reality. Id. at 10.
9. See generally supra note 8.
10. See, e.g., Brief for the Petitioners, Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997) (No.
96-110) (citing LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL'S JUDICIARY COMMITrEE, REPORT ON THE REVISED WASHINGTON
CRIMINAL CODE 153 (1970) (stating that "[w]hatever the thoughts of a potential suicide may be, it is
almost inconceivable that the threat of a two year prison sentence if he is unsuccessful in his attempt is
going to deter his act")).
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changes in society which have altered the very nature of death and the
way it is dealt with.
A. AN AGING POPULATION
It is an inescapable fact that America is aging. 11 The Census Bureau
reported that by the year 2050, the Nation's over sixty-five population
will grow from one in eight people to one in five people.12 This is due
primarily to the post World War II baby boom which saw the birth of
seventy-five million babies between 1946 and 1963.13 As the population
ages, society faces even more issues of disease, suffering, and death.
In addition, Americans are living longer.14 Since 1900, Americans
have gained twenty-eight years of life expectancy. 15 For example, a
baby bom in 1900 could expect to live to forty-nine, but today the mean
life expectancy for men and women is seventy-six. 16 In fact, those who
have, already reached fifty-five can expect to live into their eighties.17
As Americans age, health concerns become more prominent,18 and
as a result, the suicide rate increases. 19 There are forty-four suicides for
every 100,000 Americans over sixty-five, which is a striking figure when
compared to the national average for all ages of fifteen suicides per
100,000 people. 20 The trigger for suicides among the elderly is a recent
diagnosis of illness, either in themselves, or in their spouses. 2 1 The
prevalence of suicide among the elderly population seems to have
contributed to bringing the issue of physician-assisted suicide to the
forefront.
B. ADVANCES IN MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY
There have also been significant medical advances that sustain life
far beyond what would have once been considered its natural end.
22
Respirators keep "bodies breathing when lungs fail. Organs, natural or
11. The most rapidly growing age group in the United States consists of those 85 and over.
Robert Butler, Facing the Problems of an Aging America, JOURNAL OF COMMERCE, Jan. 2, 1997, at 7A.
12. Sue Fernandez, Western States Aging Fastest, TIMES-PICAYUNE, May 21, 1996, at A3.
13. Id.
14. Butler, supra note 11, at 7A.
15. Id.
16. Acting Their Age: They're Well Over 60 and They're Climbing Mountains, Jumping from Air-
planes, Running Marathons-Even Posing in the Buff, NEWSDAY, April 29, 1997, at B4.
17. Id.
18. Butler, supra note 11, at 7A.
19. Lee Siegel, Suicide Rate Among Elderly in Utah is Above Average: Suicide Rate Higher
Among Elderly Utahns, SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, Feb. 23, 1997, at BI. Elderly people are three times more
likely to kill themselves than other Americans. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Last Rights, THE ECONOMIST, June 21, 1997, at 21.
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mechanical, are transplanted. Plastic joints replace brittle bones. Failing
hearts are restarted. Artificial kidney machines cleanse the body's blood
supply while a patient casually reads a magazine." 23 The advances in
medical technology are so great that in many cases, physicians no longer
have to accept the inevitability of a patient's death.24 Instead, allowing
someone to die naturally involves a conscious decision by an entire team
of professionals not to do what they can.25
While medicine and technology have produced positive results, they
have also brought with them a new set of medical, moral, and ethical
dilemmas. 26 These new dilemmas are what have raised such a stir; the
"great unanticipated ironies of modem times that the more medical
technology can do to combat serious health problems and prolong life,
the more society must decide when not to do all that it can to avoid a
prolonged dying." 27
One extreme view of this argument sees advanced medical technolo-
gy as an interference with the natural process of dying. Opponents of
physician-assisted suicide contend that:
The large population of terminally ill Americans suffering
intolerable physical pain, personal degradation and family
trauma is directly attributable to medical advances and recent
technologies that have prolonged the life of the critically ill to
the point where the inevitable terminal stage carries with it the
potential for more suffering than the patient would have
sustained had the terminal disease been allowed to take a
natural course without the intervention of advanced medical
technologies .. .Only recent advances in medical technologies
have sustained these patients to the point of such fragility and
vegetative states that the unintended consequences of lifesaving
medical techniques is simply to prolong death, and make its
final stages even more intolerable for the patient and the
patient's family. 28
23. Andrew H. Malcolm, Medicine, Law and the American Way of Death, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30,
1984, § 4 at 7 [hereinafter American Way of Death].
24. Despite its inevitability, death is usually seen as a medical failure. Last Rights, supra note 22,
at 21. Medical technology allows physicians to circumvent this inevitability, thereby irrevocably
changing the nature of death. Id.
25. Andrew H. Malcolm, The Right to Die Still Seems More Theory than Practice, N.Y. TIMES,
June 29, 1986, § 4 at 5.
26. American Way of Death, supra note 23, section 4 at 7.
27. Andrew H. Malcolm, What Medical Science Can't Seem to Learn: When to Call it Quits,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1990, § 4 at 6.
28. Robert M. Calica, Assisted-Suicide Edict Denies Us a Right, NEWSDAY, June 30, 1997, at A25.
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For many, it seems that fear drives the desire to put an early end to
life without the benefit of aggressive medical intervention. It is fear of
the uncertain quality of life brought on by being hooked up to
life-sustaining machines, brings fear of pain, and fear of losing one's
dignity.2 9 Others are driven by a straightforward acceptance of death and
a desire to face death head on, in the natural course of events. 30
Whatever the reason, as long as medical technology continues to advance
more quickly than society's preparedness to deal with the accompanying
issues, 31 the concept of physician-assisted suicide will remain a contested
issue.
C. DEATH IN AN INSTITUTIONAL SETTING
Medical technology has not only prolonged our lives, but it has
changed the way we approach death. "Death comes to everyone, how-
ever, in our society, due to great advances in medical knowledge and
technology over the last few decades, death does not come suddenly or
completely unexpectedly to most people." 32 Rather, most people who
die are under the treatment of health care professionals. 33  Thus, it is
more likely that when death approaches, it will be in a hospital or
institutional setting. 34
As late as the 1940s, a majority of Americans died quietly at home
in bed surrounded by friends and family. 35 However, in America today,
fewer than twenty percent of deaths occur at home. 36 For many, the
thought of death in a hospital or institution is frightening because it
29. See, e.g., Malcolm, supra note 27, at 6 (stating that fear of an elongated life of decline and
suffering led Janet Adkins, a 54-year-old Alzheimer's patient, to become the first known person to
utilize Dr. Kevorkian's "suicide machine").
30. See, e.g., Andrew H. Malcolm, Fateful Choice in Fatal Illness: How Long to Live, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 14, 1986, at A12 [hereinafter Fateful Choice] (illustrating how one man chose not to seek
aggressive medical treatment to prolong his life upon learning that he had cancer, but rather chose to
"go home").
31. Andrew H. Malcolm, A Judicial Sanction for Death by Assent, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1987, § 4
at 26 [hereinafter Judicial Sanction]. Advances in medical treatment and technology leave patients,
physicians, and their families faced with the difficult decision of when to withdraw or withhold
treatment. Id. These decisions are often made in private with no guidelines as to procedure and
against the backdrop of concern about malpractice and criminal liability. Id.
32. In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404, 406 (N.J. 1987). In re Farrell addressed the right of a
competent, terminally ill adult patient living at home to discontinue using a life-sustaining respirator.
Id. at 408. The court recognized that because of medical technology, patients are often forewarned
of impending death and often choose to go home to die. Id. at 414. The court found that a competent
patient's right to exercise his or her choice to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment does not vary
depending on whether the patient is in a medical institution or at home. Id.
33. Id. at 406.
34. Judicial Sanction, supra note 31, at 26 (discussing the choices created by advances in
medical technology).
35. American Way of Death, supra note 23, at 7.
36. Last Rights, supra note 22, at 21.
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could result in a complete loss of control over the manner of death; a
loss which would not occur in the home setting. 37 Therefore, many are
choosing to forego medical treatment and "go home." 38 In addition,
those who are afraid they will not be cognizant at the time of death are
also voicing their desire to "go home" and to take with them the
knowledge necessary to end their lives. 39 As such, the increasing occur-
rence of death in the institutional setting and the fear of losing control in
that environment has also brought the issue of physician-assisted suicide
to the forefront.
D. INCREASING MEDICAL COSTS
Along with medical advances come increasing medical costs,40 but
authorities are split as to whether finances play a role in an individual's
decision to request assistance in dying. Some argue that a major compo-
nent of the suffering endured by patients with a serious illness stems
from the financial pressures created by end-of-life care which are placed
on the patient's family.41 Patients may find themselves in an atmosphere
in which they are told that their lives no longer have value, and they may
be encouraged to request assistance in dying to avoid burdening their
families any longer.4 2 However, opponents of this argument contend
that financial influences are rarely a motivating factor in requesting help
in dying because by the time patients reach the point of asking for this
type of assistance, the extremely expensive care has already been
utilized.4 3
Thus far, these emotional and morality-based arguments are purely
speculative. 44 Physician-assisted suicide is currently legal in only one
37. See, e.g., Andrew H. Malcolm, AIDS Brings Expanded Debate on Rights of the Terminally Ill,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1987, § 4 at 6 (detailing the story of an AIDS victim who had left instructions that
no 'extraordinary measures' be taken to prolong his life, but was treated for a brain infection anyway,
even though he was in a coma).
38. Fateful Choice, supra note 30, at A12.
39. Patients want to go home because traditional medical care facilities cannot properly accom-
modate the needs of dying patients. In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404, 414 N.J. 1987). Patients at home can
receive the benefit of the love, support, and concern of family members and close friends. Id. In this
situation, patients will engage in the most common form of physician-assisted suicide in which a
physician provides the "know how" and the means to commit suicide (e.g. a prescription which says
"take 50 to die") and the patient actually takes the pills without the physician being present. Last
Rights, supra note 22, at 21.
40. Gloria Shur Bilchik, Dollars and Death, HosprrALS, December 20, 1996, at 18. Treatments in
the last year of life absorb 27% of Medicare spending with 40% of that amount incurred during the




44. See, e.g., id. (commenting on growing apprehensions that if physician-assisted suicide is legal-
ized, money may be a potent force influencing a patient's decision to choose death, and managed
care organizations may subtly or overtly pressure the elderly to commit suicide rather than continue to
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state and has only recently been put into effect.4 5 Arguments on all
sides are based on various perceptions as to what legalization might
bring in this climate of high medical costs. 46 In such a climate, one can
only extrapolate from the facts available today, which show that the high
price of medical care probably will play a role in the prevalence of
requests made for assistance in dying.
First, the evidence of financial pressure is compelling.4 7 Of families
coping with a family member's terminal illness, nearly one-third will end
in poverty because they will be forced to spend all of their savings on
costly end-of-life treatments. 48 This places emotional pressure on the
terminally ill family member and is cited by physicians as a factor in the
patient's request for assistance in dying.49
Second, palliative care50 is not reimbursed at the level it should
be, 51 leaving terminally ill patients vulnerable to the alternative of
suicide. Palliative care is usually less costly than curative care, but it is
still expensive 52 which forces patients to rely on insurance. However,
some policies will not pay for a hospital stay to alleviate pain or
appropriate palliative care in the home, and those that do cover palliative
care pay only for a three or four week supply of medication despite the
fact that the dying process often lasts much longer.53 In addition, those
patients covered by Medicare will receive no assistance for pain
medications which are the central element in palliative care, placing
further financial burdens on patients and their families. 54
use costly medical services).
45. See infra note 211 (tracing the three year debate over the Oregon Death with Dignity Act
before the Act finally went into effect following the November 1997 election).
46. See supra note 44 (introducing the speculative affects of physician-assisted suicide).
47. Bilchik, supra note 40, at 18.
48. Id.
49, Melinda A. Lee, et al., Legalizing Assisted Suicide-Views of Physicians in Oregon, 334 NEW
ENGL. J. OF MED. 310 (1996). Id. In Oregon, 83% of physicians responding to a survey designed to
study the attitudes and practices of Oregon physicians in relation to physician-assisted suicide
identified financial pressures as a factor in their patient's request for help in dying.
50. Palliative care is defined by the World Health Care Organization as care for patients with an
incurable disease that focuses on treating symptoms (predominantly pain symptoms) and addresses
their existential and psychological needs. Talk of the Nation Science Friday: Palliative Care (NPR
radio broadcast, Aug. 15, 1997).
51. The way in which health care is financed acts as a barrier to the provision of palliative care.
Talk of the Nation Science Friday: Palliative Care (NPR radio broadcast, Aug. 15, 1997). Since
aggressive, acute care is more easily reimbursed, those are the services which are usually provided.
Id. Palliative care is reimbursed to a much lesser degree so there is no incentive to administer that
type of care. Id.
52. See Bilchik, supra note 40, at 18 (setting forth the idea that it would make economic sense for
insurance companies to pay for palliative care because it is less costly than aggressive medical
treatment while noting that even at a lower cost, it is still too costly for the average patient to pay out of
pocket).
53. Id.
54. Medical Issues Related to Physician Assisted Suicide: Hearings Before the Judiciary
Subcomm. on the Constitution, 104th Cong. (1996) [hereinafter Hearings on Physician-Assisted
Suicide] (statement of Kathleen M. Foley, M.D., Chief of Pain Service at Memorial Sloan-Kettering
Cancer Center and Professor of Neurology at Comell University Medical College).
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The link between paying too little for palliative care and physician-
assisted suicide is even more compelling when viewed in conjunction
with the effects of poor pain management and treatment of depression. 55
There is good evidence to suggest that physical and psychological
symptoms are major suicide vulnerability factors and that persistent pain
interferes with a patient's ability to receive support from family
members and others. 56 Many requests for aid in dying are actually
signals that more intensive efforts to comfort and care for the patient are
needed, rather than a manifestation of the desire to die.57 Therefore, if
palliative care continues to be overlooked as it is in the current health
care system, patients will be forced to consider physician-assisted suicide
merely because they lack the financial resources to obtain treatment or
services that might mitigate their condition.5 8 Each of the aforemen-
tioned factors seems to have played a significant role in the emergence
of the issue of physician-assisted suicide. These factors are not only
symptoms of a changing society, but also indicators that society has
changed its view of the nature of death, its acceptance of death, and as
will be demonstrated in the next section, even when death should occur.
III. CONCEPTUAL DIFFERENCES
The same factors that are causing society to reconsider the validity
of physician-assisted suicide have already expanded the range of choices
available to a patient at the end of his or her life. Patients are demanding
a greater voice in their treatment, and the medical community is recog-
nizing that the desires of patients should be given a higher priority.59
Recognition of patient autonomy has led to acceptance of the right to
refuse or withdraw medical treatment and to undergo terminal sedation,
but not to physician-assisted suicide.60 In an attempt to shed some light
55. Id.
56. id. Foley referred in her testimony to studies involving AIDS and cancer patients which re-
vealed the link between untreated symptoms and requests for physician-assisted suicide. Id. Untreat-
ed or under treated pain results in psychological distress, which in turn leads to depression, feelings of
vulnerability, and loss of control. Id. In addition, the very medication used to treat AIDS and cancer
can result in a degree of immobility, further adding to feelings of helplessness. Id. These circum-
stances, left untreated, result in the patient's idealization of suicide and the ultimate request for aid in
dying. Id.
57. Report of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the American Medical Association
[hereinafter Report on Ethical and Judicial Affairs], 10 Issues IN LAW & MED. 91, 95 (1994).
58. Bilchik, supra note 40, at 18.
59. Just 24 years ago, patient autonomy was an entirely different matter. Susan Brink, Taking
Charge, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, July 28, 1997, at 56. The article profiled Dax Cowart, a
successful attorney who was involved in a serious automobile accident in 1973 in which he sustained
bums over two-thirds of his body. Id. at 58. At the scene of the accident and later at the hospital,
Cowart begged medical technicians to allow him to die, but his request was refused. Id. Today,
however, it is clear that Cowart would have the right to refuse treatment. Id.
60. See infra notes 61-62, 67, 78, 82-83 and accompanying text (defining withdrawal of medical
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on the varying degrees of acceptance of these end-of-life choices, this
section will define the refusal and withdrawal of treatment and the choice
to undergo terminal sedation and compare them to physician-assisted
suicide.
A. REFUSAL OR WITHDRAWAL OF MEDICAL TREATMENT
The right to refuse or withdraw life sustaining treatment61 was recog-
nized by the Supreme Court in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department
of Health.62 In Cruzan, the Court started with the premise that at com-
mon law, even the touching of one person by another without consent or
legal justification was considered a battery. 63 This notion of bodily
integrity led to the general requirement of informed consent64 for medi-
cal treatment. 65  The Court stated that the logical corollary to the
doctrine of informed consent is the right not to consent, or to refuse treat-
ment.66 The Court recognized the right to refuse treatment as a funda-
mental right protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 67 Societal acceptance of the right to refuse or withdraw
treatment and terminal sedation, and discussing the rationale behind their acceptance).
61. Life sustaining treatment is defined by the American Medical Association as any treatment
that serves to prolong life without reversing the underlying medical condition. CODE OF MEDICAL
ETHics, supra note 3, at 39.
62. .497 U.S. 261 (1990). The parents of Nancy Cruzan sought permission of the Court to remove
artificial nutrition and hydration from their daughter which had been put into place following her
involvement in a serious automobile accident. Id. at 265. As a result of injuries sustained in the acci-
dent, Cruzan fell into a persistent vegetative state in which medical experts predicted she could remain
for another 30 years. Id. at 266. A vegetative state is one in which the body maintains its internal con-
trols (i.e. maintenance of temperature, digestive activity, and reflexive muscle response), but there is
no behavioral evidence of either self-awareness or awareness of one's surroundings in a learned
manner. Id. at 266 n.l (quoting In re Jobes, 108 529 A.2d 434, 438 (1987)).
63. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990).
64. Informed consent encompasses the patient's right of self-decision. CODE OF MEDICAL ETHIcs,
supra note 3, at 120. According to the AMA, the patient's right of self-decision can only be effec-
tively exercised if the patient has enough information with which to make an intelligent choice. Id.
The patient should make his or her own determination about treatment whenever possible (i.e. not in
cases where they are unconscious or threatened with psychological harm) and as such, the physician
has an obligation to present the medical facts accurately to the patient and to make recommendations
for management in accordance with good medical practice. Id. The AMA rejects the paternalistic
notion that the physician may remain silent because divulgence might prompt the patient to forgo
needed therapy. Id. Rational, informed patients will vary in terms of the choices they make, some
agreeing to and some refusing treatment. Id.
65. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269. Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion to Glucksberg and Vacco,
expressed his opinion that it was more than the common law notion of bodily integrity that led to the
decision in Cruzan. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2303, 2306-07 (1997) (Stevens, J.,
concurring). Stevens explained that the common law notion of bodily integrity did not mark "the outer
limits of the substantive sphere of liberty." Id. at 2307. Rather, the common law notion formed the
basis of support for the decision of the Cruzan family and, given the unusual facts of her case, could
authorize the affirmative conduct that would hasten Nancy Cruzan's death. Id. at 2306-07. Thus,
according to Justice Stevens, the Cruzan decision rested not only on the common law notion of bodily
integrity, but also on the even more fundamental right to make such a "deeply personal decision." Id.
at 2307.
66. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 270.
67. Id. at 278-79. Specifically, the Court stated that the constitutionally protected right to refuse
treatment could be inferred from prior decisions. Id.; Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22
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treatment, as opposed to a dissatisfaction with physician-assisted suicide,
is probably a matter of perspective weighing the natural course of life to
killing.
One could argue that society's acceptance of the right to refuse or
withdraw medical treatment is premised on a much simpler concept than
battery, that is, without treatment the patient would have died anyway.
Refusing or withdrawing treatment allows death to proceed naturally,
with the underlying disease being the cause of death.68 Therefore, the
decision of the patient to end his or her life is entrenched in the belief
that the disadvantages of treatment outweigh the advantages. 69 Society is
arguably more comfortable in accepting a decision to refuse medical
treatment than it is in condoning an affirmative act to end one's life
because the decision to refuse or withdraw treatment maintains the status
quo. Arguably, the patient would have died of the underlying disease
anyway, so the refusal or withdrawal of treatment merely allows the
illness to run its natural course.70
By contrast, physician-assisted suicide requires an action inde-
pendent of the disease process to cause death.71 Patients that request
physician-assisted suicide are often those who are at the terminal stage of
illness but who have conditions which do not interfere with respiration,
nutrition, or hydration. 72 Since these patients are not on life support,
they are not in a position to refuse or request the withdrawal of
life-sustaining equipment in order to hasten their deaths, 73 Rather, these
patients must look to a lethal drug or other agent to put an end to their
lives. 74
Proponents of physician-assisted suicide argue that the results of the
refusal or withdrawal of treatment and physician-assisted suicide are the
same, and therefore the acts carry with them equal moral weight. 75
However, opponents argue that it is a stretch to determine that refusing
(1990) (recognizing a due process right to be free from the unwarranted administration of
antipsychotic drugs); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494 (1980) (recognizing a general liberty interest in
refusing medical treatment); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979) (recognizing the right of a child
to be free from unnecessary medical confinement); Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 439 (1957)
(incorporating a due process right against unwarranted bodily searches); Jacobson v. Massachusetts,
197 U.S. 11, 24-30 (1905) (balancing a liberty interest in administering a small pox vaccination against
state interests).
68. Hearings on Physician-Assisted Suicide, supra note 54 (statement of the AMA).
69. Report on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, supra note 57, at 92.
70. Id. at 92-93. See also infra notes 168-190 and accompanying text (discussing the dismissal of
the Equal Protection claim in Vacco v. Quill by distinguishing physician-assisted suicide and the
withdrawal of medical treatment on the basis of causation and intent).
71. Hearings on Physician-Assisted Suicide, supra note 54 (statement of the AMA).
72. Brief of Respondents at 43-44, Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997) (No.
96-110).
73. Id.
74. Report on Judicial and Ethical Affairs, supra note 57, at 93.
75. Hearings on Physician-Assisted Suicide, supra note 54 (statement of the AMA).
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or withdrawing treatment is the same as helping a patient to commit sui-
cide. 76 Many argue that the critical difference is that physician-assisted
suicide involves taking active measures to kill an individual.77 As long as
physician-assisted suicide remains disfavored by a majority of society, it
seems that the opponents have won the argument.
B. TERMINAL SEDATION
Ironically, physician-assisted suicide is already occurring in a sense
with the utilization of terminal sedation. 78 Terminal sedation is the
administration of large amounts of controlled substances to ease pain
and induce a sleep-like state. 79  Often the administration of such large
amounts of pain medication will have the secondary effect of suppress-
ing respiration and hastening the patient's death. 80
Some view terminal sedation as a covert type of physician-assisted
suicide. 8 1 However, the medical community argues that the critical
difference between terminal sedation and physician-assisted suicide is
that the intent and desired effect of such treatment is the mitigation of
symptoms rather than the cessation of life.82 The medical community
argues that the mitigation of symptoms distinguishes the ethical use of
pain medications from the unethical application of medical skill to cause
death. 83 Terminal sedation is not viewed as assisting the patient in
achieving death, but as a fulfillment of the physician's obligation to
provide for the comfort of the patient.84
76. 142 CONG. REc. S4642 (daily ed. May 2, 1996) (statement of Bob Dole).
77. Id.
78. See, e.g., Brief of Respondents at 21-22, Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997)
(No. 96-110) (describing terminal sedation as allowing physicians to administer coma inducing
medications and monitoring patients in that state until dehydration or starvation causes death).
79. Hearings on Physician-Assisted Suicide, supra note 54 (statement of the AMA).
80. Physicians refer to this as "double effect." Paul Rousseau, M.D., Terminal Sedation in the
Care of Dying Patients, 156 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1785 (1996).
81. Id.
82. Id. "Although relief of symptoms with preserved function is the usual goal of medicine, at
the end of life, relief of suffering may predominate over all other considerations, including the main-
tenance of consciousness." Id. Terminal sedation was thus developed as pharmacotherapy based on
the doctrine of informed consent and double effect. Id. Patients exercise their right of self-decision to
determine that drug induced sedation that also hastens death would be the best form of treatment in
their situation. Id. Since terminal sedation relieves suffering and brings a peaceful death, it is con-
sidered humane. Id. This view of terminal sedation has apparently permeated the medical com-
munity. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2302 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(stating "[t]here is no dispute that dying patients ... can obtain palliative care, even when doing so
would hasten their deaths").
83. Hearings on Physician-Assisted Suicide, supra note 54 (statement of the AMA).
84. See id. "If there are no alternatives but to increase the risk of death in order to provide that
comfort, the physician is ethically permitted to exercise that option." Id.
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C. PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE
Physician-assisted suicide occurs when a physician facilitates a
patient's death by providing the necessary means or information to
enable the patient to perform the life-ending act. 85 Although the patient,
rather than the physician, is usually the administrator of the final act, the
concept of physician-assisted suicide makes many people uncomfortable
because it sanctions active participation in a traditionally condemned
activity namely, suicide.8 6 This mentality might explain why physician-
assisted suicide is commonly referred to as "mercy killing."
Opponents of physician-assisted suicide fear that it will strain the
doctor/patient relationship.8 7 This view is grounded in the belief that
physician-assisted suicide is fundamentally inconsistent with the physi-
cian's role as a healer and that sanctioning the practice will serve to
undermine the patient's belief that the physician is working wholeheart-
edly for the patient's health and welfare. 88 This argument is especially
compelling when one considers that in the Netherlands, where physicians
are allowed to perform mercy killings under strict guidelines, some
physicians are already deliberately causing the death of their patients
even when there has been no request by the patient to do S0.89 Even Dr.
Kevorkian, who forced the issue of physician-assisted suicide into the
media, has indicated that in an ideal world, physicians would determine
when a patient's life was no longer worth living. 90
Dr. Kevorkian came to the forefront in 1990 when he first used his
suicide machine to help put an end to the life of Janet Adkins, a woman
suffering from Alzheimer's disease. 91 Since then, Kevorkian has aided
85. CODE OF MEDICAL ETHics, supra note 3, at 56.
86. The Court in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't. of Health, in discussing the right to refuse or
withdraw medical treatment, also discussed the dichotomy between action and inaction. See 497 U.S.
261, 296 (1990). The argument presented to the Court was that suicide consists of an affirmative act
to end one's life whereas refusing treatment is not an affirmative act, but rather a passive acceptance
of the natural process of dying. Id. The Court rejected this distinction, stating that the relevant line
was instead somewhere between those forms of inaction that consist of abstaining from "ordinary"
care and those that consist of abstaining from "excessive" or "heroic" measures. Id. The question of
where the line should be drawn also seems relevant here, but the respondents in Washington v.
Glucksberg argued that the distinction between action and inaction as it relates to physician-assisted
suicide exists only in the minds of those who wish to preserve the appearance that they are not
participating in hastening death. See Brief of Respondents at 46, Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct.
2258 (1997) (No. 96-110).
87. Hearings on Physician-Assisted Suicide, supra note 54 (statement of the AMA).
88. Id.
89. A Dutch study found that in 1990, 0.8%, and in 1995, 0.7% of all deaths were deliberately
brought about by doctors without patient requests. Last Rights, supra note 22, at 21. See also
Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2292 (Souter, J., concurring) (expressing concern that the Dutch experience
cannot show conclusively that regulation in the area of physician-assisted suicide has resulted in an
increase or decrease in involuntary acts of euthanasia).
90. Michael Betzold, The Selling of Doctor Death, THE NEW REPUBLIC, May 26, 1997, at 22.
91. Adkins contacted Kevorkian after he received publicity for attempting to place an advertise
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at least forty-five other individuals in ending their lives. 92 Society has
clearly been unable to determine what to do with Kevorkian, as is evi-
denced by his inconsistent treatment by the law and by the medical
community. 93 In Michigan, Kevorkian's medical license has been sus-
pended, 94 while in California, Kevorkian's license has been altogether re-
voked. 95 In addition, Kevorkian has been thus far been acquitted for
every assisted suicide activity committed in the state of Michigan. 96
Some argue that the lack of enforcement of statutes prohibiting
physician-assisted suicide appears to reflect widespread societal dissatis-
faction with such laws. 97 However, it has also been proffered that even if
the laws against physician-assisted suicide are rarely enforced, their
presence still has the effect of expressing society's deep commitment to
the protection of human life.9 8
Ultimately, the legitimization of physician-assisted suicide seems to
turn on whether legalization would help or harm the public. The debate
has already been compared to the arguments preceding the legalization
of abortion. 99 In Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington,l00 Judge
ment for his suicide machine in a medical journal. Lisa Belkin, Doctor Tells of First Death Using his
Suicide Device, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1990, at Al. Kevorkian talked with Adkins' physician over a
period of several months and spent an evening with her before finding her competent to make the
decision to end her life. Id. Adkins' life came to an end as she lay in the back of a 1968 VW van
hooked up to Kevorkian's suicide machine. Id.
92. Betzold, supra note 90, at 22.
93. For example, the Michigan legislature enacted a statute which it later allowed to expire,
MICH. COMp. LAWS § 752.1021 (West Supp. 1998), in response to Kevorkian's acts of assisting suicide
on February 25, 1993, which established a commission to study voluntary termination of life and
created a new crime of "criminal assistance of suicide." See Kevorkian v. Thompson, 947 F. Supp.
1152, 1155 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
94. Id. at 1161. In this case, Kevorkian sought a court order enjoining the Oakland County Prose-
cutor from prosecuting Kevorkian for his assisted suicide activities on the grounds that the statutes and
common law under which Kevorkian had been prosecuted in the past were unconstitutional. See id. at
1154.
95. Kevorkian v. Amett, 939 F. Supp. 725, 727 (C.D. Cal. 1996). This case involved a 35 year
old male, referred to as John Doe, with AIDS who wished to obtain the aid of a physician in commit-
ting suicide. See id. The court in this case upheld a California law which criminalized aiding in a
suicide. Id. at 732.
96. Thompson, 947 F. Supp. at 1157. Interestingly, in those cases that went to trial, Kevorkian
relied on the legal premise that supports terminal sedation as his defense: that his intent was to relieve
suffering rather than to help anyone die. Betzold, supra note 90, at 22.
97. Compassion in Dying v. Washington., 79 F.3d 790, 811 (9th Cir. 1996). In one of the only
cases to recognize the right to assistance in dying as fundamental, the court in Compassion in Dying
explored societal attitudes towards physician-assisted suicide. Id. at 810-1I. The court stated that the
mere presence of a criminal sanction for assisting in death does not reflect societal disapproval of the
act. Id. at 811. Rather, the lack of enforcement shows that the opposite may be true. Id.
98. Brief of Senator Orrin Hatch et al., Amici Curiae in Support of the Petitioners at 9-10, Vacco
v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997) (No. 95-1858). The brief states that the legalization of physician-
assisted suicide will make the act an acceptable choice for those nearing the end of life. 1d. How-
ever, as long as physician-assisted suicide remains illegal, even if it is just "on the books" and rarely
enforced, physician-assisted suicide will remain a highly exceptional activity, rarely suggested or
initiated by physicians. Id. This provides greater protection to patients enduring a lingering death. Id.
99. The court in Compassion in Dying stated that like abortion, the right to die is a matter
"involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to
personal dignity and autonomy." 79 F.3d at 801 (citing Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
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Reinhardt stated that even when physician-assisted suicide was con-
demned, as abortion was for many years, it still flourished in back alleys,
in small street-side clinics, and in the privacy of the bedroom. 101 In this
context, people are forced to seek violent alternatives to physician
assistance. One could argue then that condemnation, rather than legaliza-
tion, causes more harm than good.10 2 Opponents of physician-assisted
suicide contend that legalization would harm the public because when
assisted suicide is not a legal option, the focus of care is on what can be
done to make the patient's life better.103 However, if assisted suicide
becomesIO4 a viable alternative, the system will shift its focus to whether
continued care is "worth it."105
D. A QUESTION OF ACCEPTANCE
It is apparent from the above comparisons that the acceptance of
physician-assisted suicide depends on society's perception of its
purpose. Like physician-assisted suicide, the refusal or withdrawal of
treatment and terminal sedation allow terminally ill patients to avoid
painful, undignified, and inhumane endings to their lives. 106 However, it
seems as though the primary reason that sedation and the refusal of
treatment have been accepted over physician-assisted suicide is that most
Americans simply do not view these acts as suicide. 107 The controversy
surrounding physician-assisted suicide then, centers on society's
inability to classify the act as suicide, murder, or mercy. If the
pendulum swings in favor of mercy, physician-assisted suicide will
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1991)). In addition, both activities will continue to flourish
despite prohibition. Id.
100. 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996).
101. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 801 (9th Cir. 1996).
102. Two patients of the physicians involved in Glucksberg chose violent ends. Brief of
Respondents at 27, Glucksberg (No. 96-110). Dr. Glucksberg's patient jumped from a bridge and Dr.
Halperin's patient suffocated herself. Id.
103. Brief of Senator Orrin Hatch et al., Amici Curiae in Support of the Petitioners 9-10, Vacco
v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997) (No. 95-1858).
105. See id. "The decision to cling to life may come to be regarded as wasteful, irrational, and
selfish." Id.
106. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 810.
107. Id. Congress has also recognized a distinction between physician-assisted suicide and the
right to refuse or withdraw medical care and terminal sedation in a law passed in the summer of 1997.
Assisted Suicide Funding Restriction Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-12, 111 Stat. 223 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 14401-08 (1994 & West Supp. 1998)). Collectively referred to as the
Assisted Suicide Funding Restriction Act of 1997, the several sections that make up the law state firmly
that the federal government will continue to provide funding for health care services that result in the
withdrawal or withholding of hydration or nutrition or that result in terminal sedation, but will not
provide any funding for health care services related in any way to physician-assisted suicide. 42
U.S.C. § 14401b. This funding restriction also applies to the use of funds by programs asserting or
advocating a legal right to cause, or to assist in causing the suicide, euthanasia, or mercy killing of any
individual. Id. § 14404.
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probably become as acceptable as the refusal or withdrawal of treatment
and terminal sedation are already.108
IV. ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURT DECISION
On June 26, 1997, the United States Supreme Court decided two
companion cases which addressed a person's right to commit suicide
and obtain assistance in doing so: Washington v. Glucksberg,0 9 and
Vacco v. Quill.ll0 The decision, which is largely reported in Glucksberg,
stated that the asserted right to assistance in committing suicide is not a
fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause.I11
A. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Glucksberg and Vacco challenged a Washington law11 2 and a New
York law, 113 respectively, which placed a ban on assisted suicide."14
Respondents were physicians who practiced medicine in each state and
claimed that they occasionally treated terminally ill patients who were
suffering, and declared that they would assist these patients in ending
their lives were it not for the applicable state law banning the practice. 115
Where the two cases diverge is in the framing of the question put to the
Court. The respondents in Glucksberg sought to validate the right to
physician-assisted suicide as a fundamental right protected by the Due
Process Clause, 116 while respondents in Vacco sought to invalidate the
108. Judge Reinhardt demonstrated the movement in favor of physician-assisted suicide when he
reported in his opinion for Compassion in Dying that there has been increasingly widespread support
for allowing the terminally ill to hasten their deaths and avoid painful, undignified, and inhumane
endings to their lives. 79 F.3d at 810. In April 1990, the Roper Report found that 64% of Americans
believed the terminally ill should have the right to request physician aid in dying. Id. A poll conducted
in 1991, showed that figure to be nearly two out of three Americans. Id. In addition, a Harris poll
conducted in 1994, found that 73% of Americans favored legalizing physician-assisted suicide. Id. In
addition three states, California, Oregon, and Washington, have held referenda on proposals to
legalize physician-assisted suicide, and in Oregon the proposal did pass. Id.
109. 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
110. 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
111. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2270 (1997). "The decision to commit suicide
with the assistance of another may be just as personal and profound as the decision to refuse unwanted
medical treatment, but it has never enjoyed similar legal protection." Id. "That many of the rights and
liberties protected by the Due Process Clause sound in personal autonomy does not warrant the
sweeping conclusion that any and all important, intimate, and personal decisions are so protected." Id.
at 2271.
112. A person is guilty of promoting a suicide attempt when he knowingly causes or aids another
person to attempt suicide." WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.060(1) (West 1988).
113. A person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when . . .(3) He intentionally
causes or aids another person to commit suicide." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.15 (McKinney 1987).
114. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2261; Vacco, 117 S. Ct. at 2296.
115. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2261; Vacco, 117 S. Ct. at 2296.
116. "The Plaintiffs asserted the existence of a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment which extends to a personal choice by a mentally competent, terminally ill adult to commit
physician-assisted suicide." Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2261-62.
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New York ban against physician-assisted suicide as a violation of Equal
Protection. 117
B. THE DUE PROCESS CHALLENGE
In addition to guaranteeing fair process, the Due Process Clause
provides heightened protection against governmental interference with
certain fundamental rights and liberty interests. 118 In a long line of
cases, the Supreme Court has held that the "liberty" specially protected
by the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause includes such
fundamental rights as the right to marry, 119 to have children, 120 to direct
the education and upbringing of one's children,121 to use contracep-
tion, 122 to maintain bodily integrity,123 and to have an abortion.124 The
Supreme Court has also "assumed and strongly suggested that the Due
Process Clause protects the traditional right to refuse unwanted lifesaving
medical treatment." 125 Despite this long list of fundamental rights, the
Court has always been reluctant to find new fundamental rights in the
Due Process Clause because to do so places the matter outside the arena
of public debate and legislative action. 126 Therefore, the Court analyzes
Due Process Clause claims extremely conservatively.127
The established method of conducting a substantive due process
analysis involves a two-pronged inquiry.128 First, the asserted fundamen-
tal right must be narrowly defined.129 Once defined, the asserted right
must be viewed through an objective historical lens to determine whether
117. Petitioners "urged that because New York permits a competent person to refuse life-
sustaining medical treatment, and because the refusal of such treatment is 'essentially the same thing'
as physician-assisted suicide, New York's assisted-suicide ban violates the Equal Protection Clause."
Vacco, 117 S. Ct. at 2296.
118. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2267. The "liberty" protected by the Due Process Clause
guarantees more than the absence of physical restraint. Id. Rather, the Due Process Clause "protects
individual liberty against 'certain government actions' regardless of the fairness of the procedures
used to implement them." Id. (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)).
119. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
120. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
121. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1925).
122. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 (1972).
123. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 209-10 (1952).
124. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
125. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2267 (1997); see Cruzan v. Director, Missouri
Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278-79 (1990).
126. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2267-68.
127. Cf. id. at 2268 (stating that Justice Souter, relying on Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961), would abandon the Court's restrained methodology in favor of a
test which would ask whether the Washington statute set up one of those "arbitrary impositions" or
"purposeless restraints" at odds with the Due Process Clause).
128. Id. at 2268.




the right is deeply rooted in our Nation's history and traditions.130
Second, if the right is found to be fundamental, the ban on physician-
assisted suicide must be "necessary" to serve a compelling govern-
mental interest. 13 1  However, even if the right is not found to be
fundamental, the Constitution requires that the ban on physician-assisted
suicide be rationally related to some legitimate governmental interest.132
1. History and Traditions
At stake in Glucksberg was the "existence of a [fundamental right]
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment which extends to a personal
choice by a mentally competent, terminally ill adult to commit
physician-assisted suicide."1 33 It was this narrowly defined right which
would have to stand up to the lens of history.134
"[T]he primary and most reliable indication of [a national] consen-
sus is ... the pattern of enacted laws."1 35 Following this line of reason-
ing, the Court looked to the states and found that a majority of the states
in this country have laws imposing criminal penalties on one who assists
another in committing suicide. 136 In fact, the Court found that such laws
are not innovations, but rather expressions of an over 700 year-long
tradition of punishing or otherwise disapproving of both suicide and
assisted suicide.137 While the states eventually moved away from com-
mon law penalties against suicide, no effort was made to rectify the
restraints of assisting suicide. 138 Moreover, at no time did the prohibi-
130. Id.
131. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 342-43 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting). This case concerned a
class of juvenile aliens, detained on suspicion of being deportable, who brought suit challenging an
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) regulation governing the release of detained alien juve-
niles. Id. The majority opinion found no Due Process violation, however, Justice Stevens disagreed,
stating the interest at stake was not that of being released, but rather, the right not to be detained in the
first place. Id. Justice Stevens emphasized that the right at issue is a fundamental right which triggers
strict scrutiny. Id. Under that heavy burden, the INS regulations could not be sustained. Id.
132. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2271.
133. Id. at 2261-62.
134. Id. at 2275 n.24. However, it is interesting to note that the majority viewed this challenge on
an "as applied" basis rather than a facial challenge and therefore would not "foreclose the possibility
that an individual plaintiff seeking to hasten her death, or a doctor whose assistance was sought, could
prevail in a more particularized challenge." Id.
135. Id. at 2263 (citing Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 373 (1989)). The Court begins its
examination of physician-assisted suicide by looking to laws already in existence. Id. at 2262.
136. Id. at 2262 (citing Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990)).
137. Id. at 2263. See also supra note 7 (discussing the common law treatment of suicide).
138. See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2263-64 (discussing the tradition of punishing suicide). De-
spite the removal of common law sanctions, suicide remained a grave public wrong. Id. at 2264. The
movement away from common law penalties represented not an acceptance of suicide, but rather a
reflection of the growing consensus that it was unfair to punish the actor's family for his wrongdoing.
Id.
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tions against assisting suicide ever contain exceptions for those who were
near death.13 9
Now, however, the States are engaged in a serious and thoughtful
examination of physician-assisted suicide.I 40 Advances in medicine and
technology have changed the timing and location of death leading to
public concern about how best to protect dignity and independence at
the end of life. 141 "Many States, for example, now permit 'living wills,'
surrogate health care decision making, and the withdrawal or refusal of
life-sustaining medical treatment." 142 "At the same time, however,
voters and legislatures continue for the most part to reaffirm their states'
prohibitions on assisting suicide."143 Although the debate surrounding
the legitimacy of physician-assisted suicide is beginning, the Court
found that it was confronted with a consistent and almost universal
tradition that has long rejected the asserted right.144 Therefore, the Court
determined that the asserted right to assistance in committing suicide is
not a fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause.145
2. Relation to State Interests
Since the asserted right to assistance in committing suicide was not
found to be fundamental, the Due Process Clause requires that the
statutory ban be reviewed under a test of mere rationality.146 Under such
review, the relevant inquiry became whether Washington's assisted-
suicide ban was rationally related to legitimate governmental interests. 147
The Court found that legitimate governmental interests did exist and that
the requirement of a rational relationship was unquestionably met.1
48
139. Id. at 2265. The Court cites as an example, Commonwealth v. Bowen, 13 Mass. 356 (1816),
which held that a prisoner who persuaded another to commit suicide could be tried for murder, even
though the victim was scheduled to be executed shortly. Id.
140. Id. at 2267.
141. Id. at 2265.
142. Id. at 2266.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 2269.
145. Id. at 2271. In the alternative, Respondents argued that the liberty interest they asserted was
consistent with the Court's substantive due process line of cases, if not with the Nation's history and
tradition, because the "liberty" protected by the Due Process Clause includes basic and intimate
exercises of autonomy. Id. at 2269. Respondents claimed that the constitutional principle behind
recognizing the patient's liberty interest to direct the withdrawal of artificial life support, found in
Cruzan, applies at least as strongly to the choice to hasten impending death by consuming lethal
medication. Id. at 2270. The Court rejected this argument, stating that the liberty interest found in
Cruzan was based on the common law rule that forced medication was a battery, and the long, legal
tradition protecting the decision to refuse unwanted medical treatment. Id. The Court went on to
explain that although the decision to commit suicide is just as personal as the decision to refuse
unwanted medical treatment, it has never enjoyed similar legal protection. Id.
146. Id. at 2271.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 2271-72.
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First, the Court determined that the State of Washington had an
"unqualified interest in the preservation of human life."149 This is an
interest that the states may protect in its purest form, without making
judgments as to the quality of life that a particular individual may
enjoy. 150 As with homicide laws, the states' prohibition on assisted
suicide both advances and reflects the states' commitment to this
interest. 151
Second, the Court found that Washington had an interest in prevent-
ing suicide.1 52 A study by the New York State Task Force found that
those who attempt suicide often suffer from depression or other mental
disorders.153 "Research indicates, however, that many people who re-
quest physician-assisted suicide withdraw that request if their depression
and pain are treated." 154 Thus, it is feared that if physician-assisted sui-
cide is legalized, many who would benefit from treatment for pain and
depression will remain undiagnosed, and their request for physician-
assisted suicide will be fulfilled.155 Legalization would make it difficult
for the State to protect depressed or mentally ill persons, or those who
are suffering from untreated pain, from carrying out their suicidal
impulses.156
Third, the court decided that the state had an interest in protecting
the integrity and ethics of the medical profession.15 7 In contrast to the
conclusion reached by the court of appeals, the Court adopted the
viewpoint of the American Medical Association, that physician-assisted
suicide is fundamentally inconsistent with the physician's role as healer,
and could undermine the relationship of trust that is essential to a
doctor-patient relationship by "blurring the time-honored line between
healing and harming."158
Fourth, the court determined that the state had an interest in pro-
tecting vulnerable groups from abuse, neglect, and mistakes. 159 In
defining this interest, the Court recognized the existence of subtle




153. Id. The New York Task Force on Life and the Law is an ongoing commission composed of
physicians, ethicists, lawyers, religious leaders, and interested laymen, which convened in 1984 to
study and make recommendations concerning public policy issues raised by medical advances. Id. at
2267.
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coercion and undue influence in end-of-life decisions, and stated that the
risk of harm is greatest for those individuals in society for whom
autonomy and well-being are already compromised by poverty, lack of
access to good medical care, advanced age, or membership in a stigma-
tized social group.160 The State's assisted suicide ban thus reflected and
reinforced the policy that the lives of terminally ill, disabled, and elderly
people must be of no less value than the lives of the young and
healthy.161 As such, the suicidal impulses of both groups should be
treated according to standard medical practice rather than prejudicial
value judgments.162
Finally, the court expressed that the state had an interest in avoiding
a future movement toward euthanasia and other abuses.1 63 The fear is
that the right of physician-assisted suicide, once granted to competent,
terminally ill patients, will have to be expanded to other groups as
well. 164 It is argued that if suicide is protected as a constitutional right
then every man, woman, and child must enjoy that right.165 Thus, what
began as a limited right to physician-assisted suicide could become a
much broader license which will be extremely difficult to police and
contain. 16 6
In view of the legitimate governmental interests in preserving life,
preventing suicide, protecting the integrity of the medical profession,
protecting vulnerable groups, and avoiding a movement towards eutha-
nasia, the Court held that Washington's law prohibiting the practice did
not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.167
C. THE EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGE
The challenge in Vacco centered on the Equal Protection Clause
168
of the Constitution rather than the Due Process Clause. 169 Respondents
in the case argued that because New York permits a competent person to
refuse life-sustaining medical treatment, and because this refusal is








167. Id. at 2275.
168. No state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
169. Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2296 (1997).
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assisted-suicide violates the Equal Protection Clause. 170 However, the
Court disagreed. 171
The Equal Protection Clause embodies a general rule that states
must treat like cases alike, but may treat unlike cases accordingly.172 As
such, any legislative classification or distinction that neither burdens a
fundamental right nor targets a suspect class will be upheld so long as it
bears a rational relationship to some legitimate end.1 73  Applying this
analysis to the case at hand, the Supreme Court stated that facially,
neither the New York ban on assisted suicide nor the State's statutes
permitting patients to refuse unwanted medical care treat anyone
differently or draw any distinctions between individuals. 174 "Everyone,
regardless of physical condition, is entitled, if competent, to refuse
unwanted lifesaving medical treatment; no one is permitted to assist a
suicide."175 The evenhanded application of the law therefore complied
with the Equal Protection Clause.176
However, this premise of equality was challenged by the argument
that some terminally ill patients including those on life support, are
treated differently than others since patients on life support may hasten
death by ending treatment, but patients who are not on life support may
not hasten death through physician-assisted suicide.m77  The Court
responded to this argument by stating that if such a distinction exists, it is
rational. 178 The Court went on to state that the law has long used an
actor's intent or purpose to distinguish between two acts that may have
the same result.179 In other words, the law distinguishes between acts
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 2297. It is a well settled doctrine that the "Constitution does not require things which
are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same." Tigner v. Texas,
310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940). Tigner involved a challenge to a Texas antitrust law which provided an
exclusion from criminal sanction for those persons involved in agriculture. Id. at 141. Tigner, a beer
producer charged with price fixing, argued that the statute was unfair because it allowed the supplier
of the very products he used in producing beer to engage in price-fixing behavior similar to that in
which he engaged. Id. The Court found the Texas legislature had the right to treat agriculture and the
production of beer differently. Id. at 147.
173. Vacco, 117 S. Ct. at 2297 (citing Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1627 (1996)).
174. Id. at 2297-98.
175. Id. at 2298.
176. See id. "Generally speaking, laws that apply evenhandedly to all 'unquestionably comply'
with the Equal Protection Clause." Id. (emphasis added).
177. Id. The Court stated that the differential treatment upon which the Equal Protection claim is
based depends on finding that refusing lifesaving medical treatment is "nothing more nor less than
assisted suicide." Id.
178. Id.
179. Criminal liability is normally based upon the concurrence of two factors, "an evil-meaning
mind [and] an evil-doing hand .... " Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952). At
common law, crimes generally were classified as requiring either "general intent" or "specific
intent." United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 403 (1980). Ambiguity over the terms led away from
the traditional dichotomy of intent towards an analysis of intent based on a hierarchy of culpabilities.
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committed "because of' a given end from those committed "in spite
of' a given end. 180 The difference between physician-assisted suicide
and the refusal or withdrawal of medical treatment is just such a
distinction. 18 1 A patient who requests a physician's aid in dying has the
specific intent to end his or her own life.182 In contrast, a patient who
refuses or requests the withdrawal of life-sustaining medical treatment
may not specifically intend to die, but rather may want to live, "free of
unwanted medical technology, surgery, or drugs."' 183 Given these
principles, many courts have distinguished the refusal of life-sustaining
treatment from suicide, 184 and a majority of state legislatures have drawn
a clear line by prohibiting assisted suicide and permitting the refusal or
withdrawal of medical treatment. 185
The Court disagreed with Respondents' view that the distinction
between refusing medical treatment and assisted suicide is arbitrary and
irrational.186 Instead, the Court found that logic and contemporary
practice support New York's judgment that the two acts are different and
should be treated as such.187 "By permitting everyone to refuse unwant-
ed medical treatment while prohibiting anyone from assisting a suicide,
New York law follows a longstanding and rational distinction."1 88
In addition, the Court found that New York had the same interests in
banning suicide as those articulated in Washington v. Glucksberg.189
Id. at 403-04. The levels of culpability are present in certain narrow classes of crimes where the
difference between knowledge and intent are thought to merit special attention. Id. at 405. For
example, "statutory and common law... homicide often distinguishes, either in setting the 'degree' of
the crime or in imposing punishment, between a person who knows that another person will be killed as
the result of his conduct and a person who acts with the specific purpose of taking another's life." Id.
Such distinctions based on intent are "universal and persistent in mature systems of law." Morissette,
342 U.S. at 250.
180. Vacco, 117 S. Ct. at 2299.
181. Id. at 2298 (citing Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 858 (9th Cir. 1996)
(Kleinfield, J., dissenting) (stating, "When General Eisenhower ordered American soldiers onto the
beaches of Normandy, he knew that he was sending many Americans soldiers to certain death... His
purpose, though, was to ... liberate Europe from the Nazis")).
182. Id. at 2299.
183. Id. (citing In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1224 (1985)).
184. Id. (citing as examples Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 551 N.E.2d 77, 82, 82 n.2 (N.Y. 1990)
("merely declining medical ... care is not considered a suicidal act")); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647,
665, 667n.9 (N.J. 1976) cert. denied 429 U.S. 922 (1976) (noting that there is a "real distinction
between the self-infliction of deadly harm and a self-determination against artificial life support");
and Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337, 343 (N.Y. 1986) (stating that the "right to refuse antipsychotic
medication is not absolute and may be overridden when 'the patient presents a danger to himself"').
See also State v. Vogel, 537 N.W.2d 358, 360-61, 364 (N.D. 1995) (holding that a prisoner's right to
refuse treatment for diabetes was not absolute when weighed against the state's important interest in
maintaining the confinement of the prisoner and the integrity of its correctional system).
185. Vacco, 117 S. Ct. at 2300. See also infra notes 200-205 and accompanying text (discussing
how states have expressed through legislation their approval of the refusal or withdrawal of treatment,
but not physician-assisted suicide).
186. Vacco, 117 S. Ct. at 2301-02.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. See also text accompanying notes 145-66 (discussing government interests).
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The Court stated that "[t]hese valid and important public interests easily
satisfy the constitutional requirement that a legislative classification bear
a rational relationship to some legitimate end."1 90 As such, the Court
found that the New York ban on assisted suicide did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause.191
D. HANDING THE BATON TO THE STATES
Although the decisions in Glucksberg and Vacco did not recognize
a constitutionally protected right to physician assistance in committing
suicide, the decisions will encourage the debate over legalization to
continue. 192 Plagued by the concern that the Court would be using its
position to implement its own policy preferences, the Court in effect
passed the debate back to the States.193
The Court's cautious approach in these two cases stands in sharp
contrast to its active intervention in the abortion controversy.1 94 It has
been argued that the Court leapt ahead of the public when it announced
the fundamental right to abortion in Roe v. Wade. 195 Whether or not
that is true, the effect of the Court's decision in Roe v. Wade was to
undercut the movement in many states to revise their 19th Century laws
against abortion.196
In Glucksberg, the Supreme Court recognized that laws concerning
assisted suicide are facing a reassessment similar to that of the movement
of the state to revise abortion laws, and in most cases are being
reaffirmed. 197 In light of this debate, the Court chose to exercise
caution. 198 By extending constitutional protection to an asserted right,
the Court, in effect, removes the matter from the arena of public debate
and legislative action. 199 Thus, even though the decisions in Glucksberg
and Vacco did not find the right to assisted suicide to be fundamental,
190. Vacco, 117 S. Ct. at 2302.
191. Id. The Court of Appeals in this case concluded that to the extent the New York statutes
prohibit a physician from prescribing medications to be self-administered by a mentally competent,
terminally ill person in the final stages of terminal illness, the laws are not rationally related to any
legitimate government interest. Id. at 2297. The Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 2302.
192. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2275 (1997) (stating that "Our holding
permits this debate to continue as it should in a democratic society."
193. See id. at 2268 (stating "We must, .. 'exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to
break new ground in this field,' . . . lest the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause be subtly
transformed into the policy preferences of the members of this Court.").
194. David D. Savage, High Court Refuses to Grant Constitutional 'Right to Die,' Los ANGELES
TIMES, June 27, 1997, at Al.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2265.
198. Id. at 2268 (stating "We must ... exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break
new ground [in the field of constitutional protection].").
199. Id. at 2267-68.
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by expressly permitting the ,debate to continue, the Court "did not
foreclose the possibility that physician-assisted suicide could be legalized
and regulated at the state level." 200
V. THE ISSUE AT THE STATE LEVEL
As the Court pointed out in Vacco, nearly every state has expressed
its approval of the right to withdraw or withhold treatment by passing
"living will" statutes or laws dealing with durable powers of attorney.201
In contrast, many states have long expressed their disapproval of assisted
suicide by incorporating assisted suicide into their manslaughter or
murder statutes. 202 This disapproval is evidenced by the exclusion of
individuals from liability when they harm another in an attempt to stop
that other from committing suicide, 203 and by allowing insurance com-
200. Alexandra Dylan Lowe, Facing the Final Exit, ABA JOURNAL, Sept. 1997, at 50.
201. See Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2300 n.9 (citing ALA. CODE § 22-8A-10 (1990); ALASKA
STAT. §§ 18.12.080(a), (f) (Michie 1996); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3210 (West Supp. 1996); ARK.
CODEANN. §§ 20-13-905(a), (f); 20-17-21(a), (g) (Michie 1991 and Supp. 1995); CAL. HEALTH AND
SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 7191.5(a), (g) (West Supp. 1997); CAL PROB. CODE § 4723 (West Supp. 1997);
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-14-504(4), 15-18-112(1), 15-18.5-101(3), 15-18.6-108 (1987 and Supp. 1996);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-575 (Supp. 1996); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2512 (Supp. 1996); D.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 6-2430, 21-2212 (1995 and Supp. 1996); FLA. STAT. ch. 765.309(1), (2) (Supp. 1997); GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 31-32-11(b), 31-36-2(b) (1996); HAW. REV. STAT. § 327D-13(1996); IDAHO CODE §
39-152 (Supp. 1996); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 35/9(0, 40/5, 40150, 45/2-1 (West 1992); IND. CODE §§
16-36-1-13, 16-36-4-19, 30-5-5-17 (1994 and Supp. 1996); IOWA CODE §§ 144A.11.1-.6, 144B.12.2
(1989 and West Supp. 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28,109 (1985); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.638
(Banks-Baldwin Supp. 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1299.58.10(A), (B) (West 1992); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-813(b), (c) (West Supp. 1996); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH § 5-611 (c) (1994); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 201D, § 12 (Supp. 1997); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 700.496(20) (West 1995); MINN.
STAT. §§ 145B.14, 145C.14 (Supp. 1997); MISs. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-117(2), 41-41-119(1) (Supp.
1992); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 459.015.3, 459.055(5) (1992); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-9-205(1), (7);
50-10-104(1), (6) (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-412(1), (7); 30-3401(3) (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. §
,49.670(2) (1996); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 137-H:10, -H:13, -J:l (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
26:2H-54(d), (e); -77 (West 1996); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7A-13(B)(1), (C) (Michie Supp. 1995);
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2989(3) (McKinney 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320(b), -321(f) (1993);
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 23-06.4-01, -06.5-01 (1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.12(A), (D) (Anderson
Supp. 1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 3101.2(C); -.12(A), (G) (West 1996); 20 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 5402(b) (West Supp. 1998); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-4.10-9(a), (f); 4.11-10(a), (f) (1996); S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 44-77-130; -78- 50(A), (C); 62-5-504(0) (Law Co-op. Supp. 1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§§ 34-12D-14, -20 (Michie 1994); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 32-11-110(a), 39-13-216 (Supp. 1996); TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 672.017, -.020, -. 021 (West 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1116,
-1118 (1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5260 (Supp. 1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2990 (Michie 1994);
V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 198(a), (g) (1995); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 70.122.070(1), -. 100 (Supp. 1997);
W. VA. CODE §§ 16-30-10, -30A-16(a), -30B-2(b), -30B-73, -30C-14 (1995); Wis. STAT. §§ 154.11(1),
(6); 154.25(7), 155.70(7) (Supp. 1996); WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-5-211, 35-22-109, 35-22-208 (Michie
1994 & Supp. 1996)).
202. See ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.120 (Michie 1996); ARIZ. REV STAT. ANN. § 13-1103 (West 1989
and Supp. 1997); COLO. REV. STAT ANN. § 18-3-104 (West 1997); DEL. CODE ANN. lit. 11, § 632
(1995);. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-5 (Harrison 1994); HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-702 (1993); IND. CODE. ANN.
§ 35-42-1-2 (Michie 1994); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 216.302 (Michie 1995); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
17-A, § 201 (West 1983); MIss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-49 (1994); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2505 (West
1983)..
203. See ALA. CODE § 13A-3-24 (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.430 (Michie 1996); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-403 (West 1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-605 (Michie 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
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panies to refuse to pay out benefits from a life insurance policy during
the first year or two after the date of issue if the death of the policyhold-
er resulted from suicide. 20
4
However, the tide is slowly turning, and the people are starting to
send the message to their legislators that they want the issue of
physician-assisted suicide to be reconsidered.205 The following subsec-
tions discuss a model for the legalization of physician-assisted suicide,
explain why the states are the best place to experiment with such a
model, and explore the dangers involved in legalization.
18-1-703 (West 1997); CONN.GEN.STAT. ANN, § 53a-18 (West 1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 467
(1995); 9 GuAM CODE ANN. § 7.92 (1996); HAW. REV. STAT. § 703-308 (1993); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
503.100 (Michie 1996); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 106 (West 1983); NED. REV. STAT. §§
28-1412, -1413 (1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 627:6 (1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C:3-7 (West 1994);
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.10 (McKinney 1998); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-05 (1997); OR. REV. STAT. §
161.205 (1995); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 508 (West 1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-613 (1994);
TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.34 (West 1994); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.48 (West 1996).
204. See ALA. CODE § 27-15-24 (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 21.45.250 (Michie 1996); ARuz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 20-1226 (West 1990); CAL. INS. CODE § 10235.8 (West 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. §
10-7-109 (1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-639 (West 1992); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 2926
(1989); D.C. CODE ANN. § 35-503 (1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 626.993(h)(5)(c) (West 1996 and Supp.
1998); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-25-5 (1994); HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:1OD-108 (1993); IDAHO CODE §
41-1925 (1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-451 (1996); Ky. REV. STAT. Ann. § 304.15-260 (Michie 1996);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2525 (West 1990); MD. INS. CODE ANN. § 16-215 (1995); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 83-37-13(a) (1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 376.704 (West 1991); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-20-121
(1997); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-503 (1993); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 688A.260 (Michie 1993); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 408:16(8)(d) (1995 & Supp. 1997); N.J. STAT. ANN. §17:44A-21(1)(5) (West 1994); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 59A-20-25(A)(2)(e) (Michie 1997); N.Y. INS. LAW § 3203(b)(1)(B) (McKinney 1985);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-58-22 (Supp. 1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-16-18 (1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
36, § 4024 (West 1990); P. R. LAWS ANN. tit. 26, § 1323 (1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-63-225 (Law
Co-op. 1989); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-15-45 (Michie 1996); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-908(a)(2)(C)
(1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-404 (1994); V. 1. CODE ANN. tit. 22, § 976 (1993); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 48.23.260 (West 1984); W. VA. CODE § 33-13-25 (1984); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 26-16-119
(Michie 1997).
205. Three states have held referenda on proposals to allow physician-assisted suicide for the
competent terminally ill adult: Oregon, Washington, and California. See Compassion in Dying v.
Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 810 (9th Cir. 1996). In Oregon, the measure was approved by a margin of
51% to 49% in November 1994. Id. The Oregon measure was reaffirmed by a margin of 60% to
40% in November 1997. USA Today Election '97 (last modified Nov. 20, 1997) <http://www.usa
today.com/ elect/elect97/e97orl.htm>. In Washington and California the measures narrowly failed
to pass, drawing a margin of 46%. Compassion in Dying. 79 F.3d at 810. In Maine, however, where a
poll showed that 71% of the population favored physician-assisted suicide, A. Jay Higgins, Maine
House Rejects Assisted Suicide, Backer Vows to Bring Issue Back, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Feb. 12, 1998,
the State House and State Senate voted for the fourth time to reject a bill legalizing physician-assisted
suicide by a vote of 99-42 and 25-5, respectively. Senate Rejects Assisted Suicide Legislation to Allow
Terminally Ill People to Ask a Doctor for Help in Ending Their Lives is Crushed, 25-5, PORTLAND
HERALD PRESS, Feb. 13, 1998, at B3. Supporters claim that the disparity between the poll and the vote
of the legislature suggests that the issue should be sent out to public referendum. Higgins, supra.
Opponents, however, state that the issue is too complex to be summed up in a referendum and that
voters do not really understand what is meant by physician-assisted death. Id.
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A. A MODEL FOR LEGALIZING PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE
Evidence suggests physicians are already assisting their patients with
death in hidden ways. 206 For example, a survey of Oregon doctors re-
vealed that twenty-one percent said they had been asked for a lethal dose
prescription, seven percent stated they had written such a prescription,
and nearly all of those seven percent stated their patients had taken the
medication. 207 A similar survey in Washington revealed that twenty-six
percent of physicians had been asked for a lethal dose prescription, that
physicians provided such a prescription to twenty-four percent of those
requesting it, and that fifty-five percent of those who obtained the
prescription actually took the medication. 208 Given this climate of active
physician involvement, proponents of physician-assisted suicide say laws
should be passed to bring this covert activity into the open and to
promote safeguards. 209
In November, 1994, the people of Oregon narrowly approved 210 an
Act legalizing physician-assisted suicide which contained most of the pro-
posed safeguards: the Oregon Death With Dignity Act (Oregon Act).2 11
By contrast, measures in California and Washington which did not con-
tain these safeguards did not pass when placed before the people, lend-
206. Hearings on Physician-Assisted Suicide, supra note 54 (statement of Barbara Coombs Lee,
Chief Petitioner, Oregon Death with Dignity Act).
207. Id. For a more detailed report on the survey methodology and findings see Melinda A. Lee,
et al., Legalizing Assisted Suicide-Views of Physicians in Oregon, NEW ENGL. J. OF MED., Feb. 1, 1996,
at 310.
208. Hearings on Physician-Assisted Suicide, supra note 54 (statement of Barbara Coombs Lee,
Chief Petitioner, Oregon Death with Dignity Act). But see North Dakota survey in the Appendix to
this Note where only 17% of responding physicians had been asked to provide the means or instruction
by which a patient could take his or her own life, and only one physician actually provided that
information. Infra app. at 380.
209. Hearings on Physician-Assisted Suicide, supra note 54 (statement of Barbara Coombs Lee,
Chief Petitioner, Oregon Death with Dignity Act). Dr. Kevorkian, the greatest proponent for
physician-assisted suicide, professes to act openly, but more often than not provides assistance in motel
rooms, leaving the body to be found later with a note to contact his lawyer. Anjali Sekhar & Doug
Durfee, Two Women with MS Found Dead; Kevorkian is Mum: Former Pathologist to Establish a
Panel to Identify Candidates, THE DETROIT NEWS, July 3, 1997, at DI. More recently, Kevorkian
purportedly assisted a woman in committing suicide in a Catholic church. Robyn Meredith, Kevorkian
Helps Woman Die in a Roman Catholic Church, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1997, at AI0. Safeguards which
have been proposed to make legalized physician-assisted suicide more palatable are as follows:
1) the request must come from the patient, who must be mentally competent and fully
informed about the alternatives; 2) the patient must be terminally ill, and suffering
intolerably in ways that cannot be adequately relieved by palliative measures; 3) an
independent second opinion with expertise in palliative medicine must verify that the
patient meets agreed upon criteria; 4) a psychiatrist should evaluate the patient if there
are questions about mental capacity; and 5) explicit processes of documentation,
reporting, and review should be in place so that the practice can be better understood,
improved over time, and monitored.
Hearings on Physician-Assisted Suicide, supra note 54 (statement of Timothy E. Quill, M.D.).
210. See infra note 204 (discussing voter results of referenda to legalize physician-assisted
suicide).
211. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800-897 (1996).
366
1998] NoTE 367
ing support to the theory that people want to help terminally ill patients,
but not put those who are vulnerable in jeopardy. 2 12 Thus, the probable
reason for the success of the Oregon Act was its careful crafting and
strict protections.
First, the Act limits its reach to Oregon residents 213 with a terminal
disease. 214 In this context, a terminal disease is "an incurable and
irreversible disease that has been medically confirmed and will, within
reasonable medical judgment, produce death within six (6) months." 21 5
This limitation defines the eligible group according to the imminence of
death, thus forcing many terminally ill people who fall outside of this
definition to focus on living rather than dying.216 Under this system,
patients such as Janet Adkins, the first to utilize the Kevorkian machine,
would not be able to give in to suicidal impulses at the first diagnosis of
a terminal illness. 217
212. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 810 (9th Cir. 1996). The Act was
soon caught up in legal debate. Lee v. Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382, 1386 (9th Cir. 1997). Fifteen days
before the Act was to take effect, a class action lawsuit was filed challenging the facial validity of the
statute. Id. The complaint alleged the Act violated Equal Protection, Due Process, the free exercise
of religion, freedom of association, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§
12101-12213, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797 and the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb -2000bb-4. Id. The District Court granted
preliminary injunctive relief to prevent the Act from taking effect. Lee v. Oregon, 869 F. Supp. 1429,
1439 (D. Or. 1995). The court then granted a permanent injunction and summary judgment on the
Equal Protection claim after consideration of the case. Lee, 891 F. Supp. at 1438, 1439. An appeal
was then made to the 9th Circuit which held that the parties bringing the case did not have standing and
vacated and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss. Lee, 107 F.3d at 1392. The case was
appealed to the Supreme Court where certiorari was denied. Lee v. Harcleroad, 1997 WL 274930
(U.S. Oct. 14, 1997). Republicans in Oregon then placed the measure on the November ballot asking
voters whether the Death with Dignity Act should be repealed. David G. Savage, High Court Oks
Assisted Suicide Law in Oregon Judiciary, L.A. TIMES, OCT. 15, 1997, at Al. Campaign finance
reports showed that over $3.8 million had been raised by those backing repeal of the Act, with $1.5 of
that amount being raised from Catholic organizations and church-affiliated health care organizations.
Ed Penhale, Oregon Voting Again on Assisted Suicide, SEA-rLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 3, 1997, at
Al. As the controversial campaign wore on, television ads overshadowed the issue and became
controversial themselves. See, e.g., Savage, supra (describing one ad which depicted a young person
dying in a painful, prolonged death as a result of lethal medication while a narrator states, "[h]e'll
choke on his own vomit, in painful convulsions, and linger for days."). Ultimately, the intense efforts
proved to be in vain as Oregon voters overwhelmingly rejected the measure to repeal the Act, 60% to
40%. USA Today Election '97, supra note 205.
213. See OR. REV. STAT. § 127.860 (1997). "Only requests made by Oregon residents ... shall
be granted." It is interesting to note, however, that nowhere in the statute is an "Oregon resident"
defined leading this author to wonder if the statute leaves room for terminally ill persons from other
states to move to Oregon in order to die. See generally OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800-897 (1997).
214. See OR. REV. STAT. § 127.805 (1997). "An adult who ... has been determined by the
attending physician and consulting physician to be suffering from a terminal disease ... may make a
written request for medication for the purpose of ending his or her life...". Id,
215. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800 (1997).
216. For example, Janet Adkins had been diagnosed with Alzheimer's, but was not yet sympto-
matic and probably had many years left to live. Belkin, supra note 91, at Al. Dr. Kevorkian's assisted
suicide machine allowed Adkins to make a quick decision and choose to die. Id
217. Id. See also text accompanying note 21 (noting that a key trigger for suicide among the
elderly is a recent diagnosis of illness).
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Second, the initial request to die must be in writing and signed by
two witnesses, one of whom may not be a relative by blood, marriage, or
adoption, and one of whom may not be entitled to any portion of the
estate of the qualified patient upon death by will or intestate succes-
sion. 218 This provision protects the patient from coercion or duress by
interested parties and provides some assurance that the request has been
made by the patient's own free will. 219
Third, the Act prohibits the dispensation of life-ending medication
to a patient who appears to be suffering from a psychiatric or psycho-
logical disorder, or depression causing impaired judgment. 220 Any doc-
tor or consulting physician who detects such a problem must refer the
patient to counseling. 221 This protection attempts to ensure that a de-
pressed patient will not be allowed to end his or her life, as is so common-
ly the case after patients are first told that they have a terminal disease. 222
Fourth, the Act requires that the attending physician, the consulting
physician, and a witness to the request for physician-assisted suicide
attest to the patient's ability to make an informed and voluntary
decision. 223 The informed decision requirement, along with the number
of people required to verify the patient's voluntariness, provides assur-
ance that a patient who is depressed or suffering from a psychiatric
disorder will not be misdiagnosed as competent and therefore be allowed
to carry through with the request to die.224
Fifth, the patient must reiterate his or her request, both in writing
and orally, three times before the request will be granted. 225 The patient
may rescind his or her request at any time. 226 These requirements
218. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.810 (1997).
219. See Hearings on Physician-Assisted Suicide, supra note 54 (statement of Timothy E. Quill,
M.D.).
220. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.825 (1997).
221. Id.
222. Belkin, supra note 91, at Al. See also accompanying text (discussing the circumstances
surrounding the death of Dr. Kevorkian's first patient).
223. See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.810, -.815, -.820 (1997). An "informed decision" is a decision
by a qualified patient, to request and obtain a prescription to end his or her life in a humane and
dignified manner, that is based on an appreciation of the relevant facts and after being fully informed
by the attending physician of: a) his or her medical diagnosis; b) his or her prognosis; c) the potential
risks associated with taking the medication to be prescribed; d) the probable result of taking the
medication to be prescribed; e) the feasible alternatives, including, but not limited to, comfort care,
hospice care, and pain control. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800 (1997).
224. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.825. The statute specifically provides that medication to end a
patient's life may not be prescribed until the person counseling the patient is convinced that the patient
is not suffering from a psychiatric or psychotic disorder or depression. Id.
225. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.840 (1997). "In order to receive a prescription for medication to end
his or her life in a humane and dignified manner, a qualified patient shall have made an oral request
and a written request, and reiterate the oral request to his or her attending physician no less than
fifteen (15) days after making the initial oral request." Id.
226. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.845 (1997).
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applied together help ensure that the patient will not be given physician
assistance in dying following a hasty decision that has never been
reevaluated. Rather, the request must be carefully made and reiterated in
order to determine the true conviction of the patient. 227
Finally, the Act requires documentation at every step. 228 This
provides assurance that the statutory procedure will be strictly followed
and that physicians will not implement their own ad hoc procedures
which would make death more easy to come by in the future.229
Each of these safeguards helps to regulate the issue of physician-
assisted suicide. 230 It is unlikely that without these safeguards the
measure would have passed at all. 231 As the debate continues then,
legislatures will probably look to the Death With Dignity Act as a model,
or at least a starting point, for their own legislation.
B. THE STATES AS LABORATORIES
Even if safeguards are imposed in an effort to legalize physician-
assisted suicide, there are still several areas left unexplored, and great
potential for abuse. The issue is not a simple one, rather it is fraught
with complexities and spans several areas of civil and criminal law,
227. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.840.
228. The following shall be documented or filed in the patient's medical record:
1) All oral requests by a patient for medication to end his or her life in a humane and
dignified manner; 2) All written requests by a patient for medication to end his or her life
in a humane and dignified manner; 3) The attending physician's diagnosis and prognosis,
determination that the patient is capable, acting voluntarily and has made an informed
decision; 4) The consulting physician's diagnosis and prognosis, and verification that the
patient is capable, acting voluntarily and has made an informed decision; 5) A report of
the outcome and determinations made during counseling, if performed; 6) The attending
physician's offer to the patient to rescind his or her request at the time of the patient's
second oral request pursuant to § 127.840; and 7) A note by the attending physician
indicating that all requirements under §§ 127.800-.897 have been met and indicating the
steps taken to carry out the request, including a notation of the medication prescribed.
Id. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.855 (1997).
229. Cf Last Rights, supra note 22, at 21 (noting that in the Netherlands where there are strict
guidelines for physician-assisted death, the Dutch are already engaging in euthanasia, sometimes
without patient consent, and many cases go unreported).
230. Cf. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2267-68 (1997) (stating that the Court must
move cautiously when asked to break new ground because a declaration of the right to
physician-assisted suicide is fundamental would remove the issue from the arena of public debate and
legislative action).
231. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 810 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that two
other statutes which did not contain the safeguards found in the Oregon Death With Dignity Act failed
to pass).
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medical ethics, and social morality. 232 It is for this reason that the
Supreme Court left the issue for the states to resolve.233
The states provide the perfect arena for testing new ideas because a
single state can test new social policy without harm to the rest of the
country. 234 Other states can then benefit from the experiences of the
experimental state, avoiding those approaches that proved to be prob-
lematic and adapting those that were successful.235 In this way one or
more states serve as laboratories to the rest of the Nation. 236
This laboratory approach works best when the issue at hand, such as
physician-assisted suicide, is divisive. The laboratory approach allows
the issue to be dealt with comprehensively and ensures that the interests
of all institutions and individuals are properly accommodated. 237 If the
Supreme Court had decided the issue unequivocally, there would
arguably have been a public backlash exceeding that which occurred
when the Court legalized the right to abortion in Roe v. Wade.23 8 Since
the Court was aware of a potentially explosive reaction, they took a new
stance: when in doubt, do not create new rights.239 To do so is to run
the risk of deciding the issue based on the Court's own assessment of the
weight of competing moral arguments. 240 It is therefore considered
more acceptable to leave the issue to the legislative forum, where fact
finding can be less confined and the viewpoints of all interested parties
can be synthesized. 241
232. In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404, 407-08 (N.J. 1987). This case focused on the withdrawal of
medical treatment rather than physician-assisted suicide, however, the discussion contained therein
relating to autonomy in end-of-life decisions is relevant to the debate over physician-assisted suicide.
See generally id. at 410-16.
233. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2275.
234. Brief for Petitioners at 48, Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997) (No. 96-110).
The federal system allows each state to grapple with its own complex issues of public policy without
effect on the other states. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. In re Farrell, 529 A.2d at 407.
238. See supra text accompanying notes 192-96 (discussing the view that the Court acted too
quickly in creating the fundamental right to abortion).
239. David G. Savage, High Court Refuses to Grant Constitutional Right to Die, L.A. TIMES, June
27, 1997, at Al.
240. In a Florida Supreme Court case, an injunction was sought to prevent the state attorney from
prosecuting a physician who had assisted a man in committing suicide, however, the court recognized
that the decision to allow physician-assisted suicide was beyond its scope. Krischer v. Mclver, 697
So.2d 97, 104 (Fla. 1997) (deciding the issue of physician-assisted suicide at the state level). "By
broadly construing the privacy amendment to include the right to assisted suicide, we would run the
risk of arrogating to ourselves those powers to make social policy that as a constitutional matter belong
only to the legislature." Id.
241. See In re Farrell, 529 A.2d at 407-08 (stating that the right to withdraw life-sustaining
medical treatment involves fundamental societal questions that are better resolved in the legislature).
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C. DOWN THE SLIPPERY SLOPE TOWARD EUTHANASIA
With the issue in the hands of the states, the question becomes
whether the legalization of physician-assisted suicide should be consid-
ered at all. In other words, once the states start down the path towards
legalization, the question is whether they will be able to stop at
physician-assisted suicide, or whether they will be slipping into the realm
of euthanasia. 242
The need for carefully controlled safeguards in order to legalize
physician-assisted suicide seems to be a strong indicator that physician-
assisted suicide has no nexus to the concept of "liberty" as that term is
understood in the Supreme Court's construction of Due Process. 243
That in itself should give the states reason to pause. While the right to
seek an abortion is a fundamental right with safeguards attached, the
interests implicated in that situation are very different. 244 The decision
in Roe v. Wade addressed a woman's right to privacy 245 and the State's
interest in preserving the life of the mother. 246 However, there is no
implication that abortion involves the taking of the life of a "person"
recognized by the Constitution. 247 In contrast, physician-assisted suicide
does involve the taking of a life entitled to constitutional protection. 248
It would seem that recognizing a fundamental right to die is directly
adverse to the constitutionally protected right to live.249
Further, the states should question at what point on the continuum
they will be able to limit the right to physician-assisted suicide if it is
legalized. Opponents say that while it is tempting to believe that the
242. In contrast to physician-assisted suicide, "[e]uthanasia is defined as the physician intentional-
ly administering a treatment (usually medication) to cause a patient's death," with or without the
patient's consent. Hearings on Physician-Assisted Suicide, supra note 55 (statement of Kathleen M.
Foley, Chief of Pain Services, Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center). In this case, then, the
physician performs the act, whereas in physician-assisted suicide, the physician is merely providing
"assistance." Id.
243. Reply Brief for Petitioners at 11, Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997) (No.
96-110). Petitioners contend that physician-assisted suicide, if legalized, would be a right for which
exercise would be limited to only a few people and would be closely regulated to avoid its abuse. Id.
Petitioners further contend that no other fundamental right granted constitutional protection carries
with it such restrictions. Id.
244. See infra notes 245-48 and accompanying text (explaining that the interests involved in the
right to have an abortion do not involve the taking of a life).
245. "The right of privacy, whether it be founded in the 14th Amendment's concept of personal
liberty ... or ... in the 9th Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to
encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 153 (1973).
246. Id. at 163. "[A] State may regulate the abortion procedure to the extent that the regulation
reasonably relates to the preservation and protection of maternal health." Id.
247. Id. at 156-57. If the suggestion that a fetus is a person is established, "the appellant's case,
of course, collapses, for the fetus' right to life would then be guaranteed specifically by the
Amendment." Id.
248. Reply Brief for Petitioners at 1I, Glucksberg (No. 96-110).
249. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 159 (recognizing life as entitled to 14th Amendment protection).
NOTE
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right will be limited to "competent terminally ill adult" patients, any
attempt to confine the right to such circumstances is likely to fail.250
First, "if death is defined as 'mercy,' it will be difficult to justify
refusing this mercy to broader and broader categories of sufferers." 251
There are a wide variety of circumstances that a reasonable person may
not be able to endure, but not all of them involve the prospect of an
immediate and painful death.252 Such was the case of Janet Adkins who
faced an uncertain future with Alzheimer's disease. 253 Such might also
be the case for a quadriplegic, the victim of a paralytic stroke, and a
person afflicted with severe arthritis. 254 Yet under the articulated
safeguards for physician-assisted suicide, these people would be
excluded from the right to end their suffering for failure to "qualify
under somebody else's standards." 255
Second, physician-assisted suicide carries with it the danger of being
used to rid society of "undesirables,"25 6 which are often defined as the
elderly, the poor, and the disabled.257 These are the people that may be
pressured into choosing death because of poverty, or because they have
certain characteristics which place them in the shadow of societal
prejudice. 258 It is also the private nature of the doctor-patient relation-
ship that places these people most at risk. 259 The arrangements between
doctor and patient are made behind closed doors, making them very
hard to monitor,260 and very hard to enforce since the only witness is
dead.261 Rather than being utilized to legitimately put an end to suffer-
ing, physician-assisted suicide may be seen as a way to ease the load on
an overburdened medical system.262 This may occur by eliminating
250. Brief of Senator Orrin Hatch et al., Amici Curiae in Support of the Petitioners at 8, Vacco v.
Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997) (No. 95-1858).
251. Id.
252. Brief for Petitioners at 45-46, Glucksberg (No. 96-110) (quoting Yale Kamissar, Are Laws
Against Assisted Suicide Unconstitutional?, HAsTiNGs CTR. REPORT, May-June 1993, at 32, 36-67.
253. Belkin, supra note 91, at Al.
254. Brief for Petitioners at 45-46, Glucksberg (No. 96-110) (quoting Kamissar, supra note 252,
at 36-37).
255. Id.
256. Hearings on Physician-Assisted Suicide, supra note 54 (statement of Carlos F. Gomez).
257. See supra text accompanying notes 158-59 (stating that the risk of harm from physician-
assisted suicide is greatest for those for whom autonomy is already compromised by poverty, lack of
access to good medical care, advanced age, or membership in a stigmatized social group).
258. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2273 (1997) (stating that the risk of harm is
greatest for these groups because the characteristics that define them also compromise their
autonomy).
259. ABC Nightline (ABC television broadcast, Jan. 9, 1997).
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. The harsh reality is that a more expeditious death for terminally ill patients would often
serve the interests of others, especially in this era of managed care and exploding medical costs."
Brief of Senator Orrin Hatch, Amici Curiae in Support of the Petitioners at 4, Washington v.
Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997) (No. 96-110).
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rather than improving the care of those who are already receiving im-
proper treatment for their pain, depression, and psychological distress. 263
The experiences of the Dutch since implementing guidelines for
mercy killings lend support to this idea. 264 Even though mercy killings
are permitted in Holland if physicians follow strict guidelines, a number
of cases still go unreported. 265 In addition, there has been an increase in
the number of deaths brought about by doctors without the patient's
request. 266 As such, the definition of physician-assisted suicide has been
expanded to include the chronically ill, and the emotionally dis-
tressed. 267 Such experiences lend support to the notion that once we
start down the path to physician-assisted suicide, it is unlikely that we will
be able to stop short of euthanasia.268
Finally, one must ask if a request for physician-assisted suicide can
ever be rational. In deciding a case involving medical coverage for a
suicide victim, the Court in Reinking v. Philadelphia American Life Insur-
ance Company269 articulated three categories of insanity which deter-
mine whether a woman who attempted to kill herself after a series of
miscarriages could be held responsible for her suicidal acts, thereby
relieving the insurance company of liability for her medical bills.270 The
third category is relevant to the issue of physician-assisted -suicide.
The third category involves an "insane" impulse that so over-
whelms will or rational thought that the individual is unable to resist the
desire to commit suicide. 271 Legally, for one to prove that the actor
could not be responsible for his or her acts, one must show that the actor
was unable to make a meaningful choice between committing and not
263. "[1]f patients' requests for assistance in suicide are honored, many will die unnecessarily."
Brief of Senator OrrinHatch, Amici Curiae in Support of the Petitioners at 6, Glucksberg (No.
96-110). The desire to commit suicide is typically associated with depression or pain. Id. at 6-7.
"When a suicidal patient is helped to deal with pain and depression, he or she typically is restored to
the natural desire to live." Id. at 7.
264. Last Rights, supra note 22, at 21.
265. Id.
266. Id. Alarmingly, if euthanasia occurs without a patient request, the patients are often
described as incompetent, that is, the patient has become permanently comatose, or the patient has
suddenly deteriorated to the point of being unable to say what he or she wants. Id.
267. Id.
268. See id. (stating we have already slid down both slippery slopes; the inclusion of chronically
ill and mentally distressed). See also Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2291-92 (Souter, J.
concurring) (expressing concern over the substantial debate about what the Dutch experience shows,
and stating that for now, it is the very fact that there is disagreement that matters).
269. 910 F.2d 1210 (4th Cir. 1990).
270. Reinking v. Philadelphia Am. Life Ins. Co., 910 F.2d 1210, 1215 (4th Cir. 1990). The three
categories were: 1) the person who is delusional and is unable to understand the physical
consequences of his or her act; 2) the person "who cannot appreciate the moral character" of his or
her acts; and 3) the "insane" impulse that so overwhelms the will or rational thought that the individual
is unable to resist the desire to commit suicide. Id. at 1215-16.
271. Id.
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committing suicide. 272 This poses a dilemma because any person who
actually commits suicide was unable to overcome the impulse.273 On the
other hand, any person attempting to commit suicide who understands
the physical consequences of the act may be acting rationally in the
sense that he or she had decided that they prefer not to bear the burden
of living. 274 However, even a rational decision may be colored by depres-
sion or psychiatric disorders without which the actor would not have
chosen to commit suicide. 275 The measure of sanity or rationality is thus
riddled with circular logic.
Rather than attempt to maneuver through the circle of reasoning,
the Court in Reinking chose to create a blanket rule that "[i]f an afflic-
tion renders a person unable to resist an impulse to commit an act, then
the resulting actions are "unintentional" regardless of whether a rational
person would have chosen to commit the same act." 276 It seems con-
trary to this reasoning, then, to assume that a few safeguards would
instantly make suicide a rational act merely because the actor seeks the
aid of a physician in dying. Thus, those states that choose to experiment
with the legalization of physician-assisted suicide should exercise caution
in dealing with this highly complex issue.
VI. CONCLUSION
When this author first began researching the topic of physician-
assisted suicide, the issue was viewed with deep compassion and the belief
that people have the right to end their lives if they are suffering, and
therefore to request the assistance of a physician in doing so. However,
the research uncovered has transformed this author's compassion into
fear. Physician-assisted suicide carries with it great potential for abuse.
There is no set of safeguards to persuade this author that physician-
assisted suicide would be limited to only those people who have a strong,
voluntary conviction that death is in their best interest. It is likely that
once the right to physician-assisted suicide is granted, the move will




275. Hearings on Physician-Assisted Suicide, supra note 55 (statement of Kathy Foley, Chief of
Pain Services, Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center).
276. Reinking, 910 F.2d at 1216.
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For these reasons, this author would recommend extreme caution
when considering any scheme legalizing physician-assisted suicide.
Kelly Lyn Mitchell
277
277. The author would like to thank her husband, Dean Mitchell, for staying away at all the right
times and each of the 98 North Dakota physicians who for responded to the survey reported in the




I. SURVEY OF NORTH DAKOTA
In light of all this author learned about the issue of physician-
assisted suicide, this author was curious to know how North Dakota
would fare in the debate. To that end, a survey modeled after those that
had been distributed in Michigan' and Oregon2 was prepared in order to
ascertain the views and opinions of North Dakota physicians. 3 Section II
of this appendix discusses and interprets the results of the North Dakota
survey, while Section III contains a copy of the survey and its numeric
results.
II. FINDINGS AND INTERPRETATION
Part I of the survey consisted of general questions such as age,
specialty, and religion, which were later used to distinguish answers
among various groups. Part II focused on obtaining each physician's
view of physician-assisted suicide under differing circumstances.
When asked outright, forty-five percent of respondents stated that
they believe a person faced with a terminal disease has the right to end
his or her life.4 However, several physicians qualified their answers by
commenting that every person has the "right" to end his or her life, but
that the law does not give them the means. Others stated that individuals
already have the right to refuse treatment, which would presumably
bring about the same effect.
There was no significant correlation between a physician's specialty
or age and his or her belief in a patient's right to assisted suicide. How-
ever, there was a strong correlation when the belief in the right to die was
coupled with the strength of a physician's religion. Of those for whom
religion is very important, sixty percent stated that a terminally ill person
does not have the right to take his or her life. For those that view
1. See generally Jerald G. Bachman et al., Attitudes of Michigan Physicians and the Public
Toward Legalizing Physician-Assisted Suicide and Voluntary Euthanasia, 334 NEw ENGL. J. OF MED.
303 (Feb. 1, 1996); David J. Doukas et al., Attitudes and Behaviors on Physician-Assisted Death: A
Study of Michigan Oncologists, 13 J. CliNIC.L ONCOLOGY. 1055 (May 1995).
2. See generally Melinda A Lee et al., Legalizing Assisted Suicide-Views of Physicians in Ore-
gon, 334 NEw ENGL. J. OF MED. 310 (Feb. 1, 1996).
3. In conducting this survey, 201 surveys were sent to physicians within the State of North
Dakota. The physicians were chosen from regional phone books. Physicians within specialties which
were unlikely to have experienced a request for physician assistance in death (i.e. podiatrists and
pediatricians) were eliminated. Four surveys were returned as undeliverable, and 98 complete
responses were received.
4. See infra at 4.
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religion as only somewhat important, fifty-nine percent stated that a
terminally ill person does have that right.
A similar relationship was found to exist between strength of relig-
ion and a physician's role in physician-assisted suicide. For those that
view religion as very important, seventy-two percent stated that
physician-assisted suicide is incompatible with the physician's role as
healer. Responses from those for whom religion is only somewhat
important were less telling, with forty-six percent stating that
physician-assisted suicide is inconsistent with the physician's role as
healer, and fifty-two percent stating physicians should support assisted
suicide.
Finally, a good relationship was shown between the strength of an
individual's view of religion and a physician's likelihood to choose
physician-assisted suicide for himself. Of those for whom religion was
very important, fifty-four percent stated that they would definitely not
choose physician-assisted suicide. However, those for whom religion is
only somewhat important were less certain and their responses were
distributed virtually evenly. Religion then, seems to be a driving force in
the resolution of this issue.
Seventeen percent of respondents stated they had been asked to
provide a patient with the means or instruction to end his or her life. 5
However, only one physician stated that he actually provided the patient
with that information. 6
Surprisingly, only forty-one percent of respondents were
unequivocal as to what their decision would be when faced with their
own terminal illness: thirty-six percent would definitely not choose
physician-assisted suicide, and five percent would. 7 The other fifty-one
percent fell into the more uncertain categories with fourteen percent
stating that they probably would choose physician-assisted suicide,
twenty-six percent stating that they were uncertain, and nineteen percent
stating that they would probably not choose physician-assisted suicide.8
A strong majority, fifty-seven percent, stated that it would not be
acceptable to give a patient medication to allow that patient to end his or
her life.9 In addition, fifty-eight percent :of respondents agreed with the
statement that physician-assisted suicide is inconsistent with the physi-
cian's role as healer. When the two questions were cross-checked for a
correlation, the answers were consistent. Eighty-seven percent of those
5. Id.
6. Id.





who did not agree that it was acceptable to provide a patient with lethal
medication also stated that physician-assisted suicide is incompatible with
the physician's role as healer. The same consistency was found between
those who agreed with giving lethal medication and those who believed
that physicians should support physician-assisted suicide. In addition,
ninety-five percent of those who stated that a person does not have the
right to die also did not agree with giving a patient lethal medication,
while those that did believe in the right to die answered affirmatively
across the board on the issue of giving a lethal prescription. This find-
ing is consistent with the position of the American Medical Association,10
which indicates that North Dakota physicians are in tune with the views
of the national medical profession.
II. SURVEY LAYOUT AND RESULTS
PART I: PERSONAL INFORMATION
The information you provide in this section will be kept confidential and
will be used for analysis of this survey only.
In what year were you bom?
30-39 yrs: 15% 40-49 yrs: 44% 50-59 yrs: 24% 60+ yrs:16%
Sex: M: 99% F: 1%









Is your practice primarily: Office-based: 69% Other: 11%
Hospital-based: 19%
10. Report of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the American Medical Association,
10 Iss. in LAW AND MED. 91, 93 (Nov. 1, 1994) (stating that "the medical profession has rejected
assisted suicide as fundamentally inconsistent with the professional role of physicians as healers").
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How important is religion to you?
Very: 51% Somewhat: 47% Not at all: 2%
PART H: YOUR VIEWS
Do you think a person has the right to end his or her own life if the
person has an incurable disease?
Yes: 45% No: 38% Not Sure: 17%
Which of the following best describes your views about whether a physi-
cian should ever be allowed to take action in response to a patient's
request for assisted death?
56% I oppose any form of physician-assisted suicide.
16% I support some forms of physician-assisted suicide, but only
if the patient takes the final action.
7% I support the physician taking the final action, but only when
it is impossible for the patient to do so.
11% I support either the patient or the physician taking the final
action.
9% Uncertain.
Have you ever been asked to provide the means or instruction by which
a patient could take his or her own life?
Yes: 17% No: 83%
If yes, have you provided the patient with that instruction?
Yes: 4% No: 94%
If physician-assisted suicide were legalized in the State of North Dakota,
would you be likely to participate if requested by a patient?
60% I would not participate in any form of physician-assisted
death or suicide.
13% I might be willing to participate in some forms of physician-
assisted suicide, but only if the patient takes the final action.
14% I might be willing to participate with either the patient or the
physician taking the final action.
12% Uncertain.




7% Patients request physician-assisted suicide because they are
concerned about being a burden upon their family.
53% Patients request physician-assisted suicide because they are
experiencing severe suffering or physical pain.
0% Patients request physician-assisted suicide because they are
worried about medical costs.
6% Patients request physician-assisted suicide because they do
not want to be dependent on others for some or all of their
physical care.
15% Patients request physician-assisted suicide because they want
to die with dignity.
15% Combination of the above.
Please try to imagine that doctors have discovered you have a terminal
illness that is certain to involve a great deal of pain and suffering. If
physician-assisted suicide were legally available, do you think you would
request it for yourself?
Yes, definitely: 5%
Probably: 14%
Uncertain, can't say: 26%
Probably not: 19%
Definitely not: 36%
Giving medication to a patient with the intent to allow that patient to end
his or her life is acceptable.
Agree: 15% Neutral: 28% Disagree: 57%
More attention to pain control and palliative care would eliminate the
need for physician-assisted suicide.
Agree: 57% Neutral: 22% Disagree: 20%
With which of these statements do you most agree?
58% Physician-assisted suicide is incompatible with the
physician's role as healer.
33% Physicians should support assisted suicide based on their
responsibility to alleviate suffering and render compassionate
care.
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With which of these statements do you most agree?
23% Physician-assisted suicide would be ethical in some cases.
18% My religious beliefs would deter me from facilitating in a
patient's death.
16% Fear of legal repercussions would deter me from facilitating
in a patient's death.
22% Physician-assisted suicide is immoral.
